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November 3, 2006 
Pat Bartholomew, Clerk 
Utah Supreme Court 
450 South State Street, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0210 
Re: State of Utah v. Wallace, Case No. 20051115-SC (on certiorari) 
Citation to Supplemental Authority 
Dear Ms. Bartholomew: 
On behalf of Gerald Steven Wallace, defendant/petitioner herein, I write to 
provide citation to supplemental authority pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(j). 
Briefing is complete and oral argument occurred November 2, 2006. 
1. Art. I § 12 ("[T]he accused shall have . . . the right to appeal in all cases"). 
State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978) ("It is the sentence itself which 
constitutes a final judgment from which appellant has the right to appeal"). Utah 
R. App. Pro. 4(a) (filing the notice of appeal must occur within 30 days of the 
entry of judgment). State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, 106 P.3d 729 (affirming 
decisions from the Court of Appeals that stem from the defendant's untimely 
attempts to appeal his sentence). Utah R. Crim. Pro. 22(e) ('The court may 
correct an illegal sentence . . . at any time"). These authorities relate to the 
suggestion at oral argument that Mr. Wallace's appeal may not be ripe, or that it 
proceeds in the nature of a declaratory judgment. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12)(e)(ii) (Supp. 2006) ("Upon a finding that the 
defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may order the probation 
revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew" 
(emphasis added)). This relates to the suggestion at oral argument that the trial 
court may continue probation based only upon unpaid restitution even where, for 
example, the probationer is complying with an agreed upon payment schedule. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
John Pace 
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner 
cc: 9 copies (and original) to the Utah Supreme Court 
4 copies to Matthew D. Bates and Charlene Barlow, Ass't Attorneys General 
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THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Appellee/Respondent, : 
v. : 
Case No. 20051115-SC 
GERALD STEVEN WALLACE, : 20040877-CA 
Appellant/Petitioner. : 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) 
(2002). This Court granted certiorari review by Order (Feb. 21, 2006) (attached as 
Addendum A). 
OPINION BELOW 
The Court of Appeals opinion is published as State v. Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, 
124 P.3d 259 (attached as Addendum B). 
ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARD OF REVIEW and PRESERVATION 
1. "Whether Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) creates a thirty-six month 
limitation for a term of probation as to any felony conviction." Order (Feb. 21, 2006) 
(Addendum A). 
2. "Whether consecutive terms of probation for multiple convictions may be 
imposed." Id. 
This Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals for correctness. In re 
A.T., 2001 UT 82,1j 5, 34 P.3d 228. The Court of Appeals reviewed the illegality of the 
sentence as a question of law. State v. Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, % 9 (Addendum B) 
(citing State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). 
This Court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const, amend. V: Addendum C. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (2003): Addendum D. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003): Addendum E. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 2005): Addendum F. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 9, 2002, the state filed an Information charging Gerald Steven 
Wallace with three counts of securities fraud in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2) 
(2000), selling an unregistered security in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 (2000), 
selling a security without a license in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (2000), and a 
pattern of unlawful activity in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 (2003). (R. 1.) 
The jury convicted Mr. Wallace on all charges. (R. 414 at 456-57.) 
The court imposed four one-to-fifteen-year sentences for the second-degree 
felonies and two zero-to-five-year sentences for the third-degree felonies, and ordered 
them to run consecutively. (R. 381-84; Minutes: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment, 
attached as Addendum G.) The court suspended the prison sentences, placed Mr. 
2 
Wallace on 144 months of probation, and imposed restitution of $626,000, for which Mr. 
Wallace is jointly and severally liable with co-defendants. (Id.) 
Mr. Wallace timely appealed the convictions claiming the evidence was 
insufficient, and challenging the legality of the 144-month probation period. On October 
14, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and the sentence. Wallace, 2005 
UTApp434. 
Following one stipulated motion for an extension of time, Mr. Wallace filed a 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari on December 9, 2005. The petition sought review of the 
Court of Appeals' decision upholding the legality of 144 months of probation. Id. On 
February 21, 2006, this Court granted the petition, and defined the two questions for 
review as set forth above. Order (Addendum A). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Wallace was sentenced to four one-to-fifteen-year sentences, and to two zero-
to-five-year sentences, all to run consecutively. (R. 381-82 (Addendum G).) This creates 
a potential range for incarceration of from four to seventy years. The trial court, 
however, suspended the prison sentences and imposed 144 months of probation. (R. 
383.) The trial court decided to impose a lengthy probation period so as to retain 
jurisdiction to enforce Mr. Wallace's substantial restitution obligation; it settled upon 144 
months because that is what a co-defendant who pleaded guilty in the course of the same 
investigation also received: 
The Court: ... I'm going to suspend the entirety of all of the sentences. 
I'm not imposing a fine. I'd rather see any money go towards restitution in 
this case rather than the payment of any fine. I don't want you on probation 
3 
for 36 months. Probation is going to be a lot longer than that. J want it 
longer intentionally so that we're giving you as long an opportunity as 
possible to make restitution payments. How far can I set it with six 
consecutive felonies? 
Mr. ?: Well, I think you can run it 36 months -
The Court: Currently on each one? 
Ms. Barlow (the prosecutor): Mr. Harrison is on probation for 12 years. 
The Court: That's what I'm inclined to do in this particular case as well. 
Place you on probation for a period of 144 months, a 12-year period. I'm 
going to order restitution.... 
(R. 415 at 11 (emphasis added); the sentence hearing transcript is attached as Addendum 
H.) While Mr. Wallace's 144 months of probation flowed from convictions for four 
second-degree, and two third-degree felonies, Mr. Harrison's 144 months of probation 
flowed from his having pleaded guilty to two second-degree and two third-degree 
felonies. (R. 412 at 282.) 
The Minutes: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment reflect the imposition of 144 
months of probation. (R. 383 (Addendum G).) The Minutes, however, mention nothing 
about consecutive terms of probation. (See id.) 
The Presentence Investigation Report recommends only thirty-six months of 
probation. (R. 411 at 2.) 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals relied upon Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10)(a)(i) 
(Supp. 2005)1 to conclude a court may impose probation of any length of time 
1
 The Court of Appeals, in Wallace, references the version of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 
in effect in 2003. This section, specifically § 77-18-l(8)(a)(iv) (referral options for 
4 
whatsoever. In so doing, it cited for support the legislature's amendment of section 77-
18-1 in 1989. Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, ^ 18 & n.8. While the appeals court noted 
that Mr. Wallace's 144 months of probation was shorter than the potential maximum of 
his suspended prison terms, it did not impose or suggest a limit to probation based upon 
the potential length of incarceration. Id. at f 19. It characterized its prior and 
contradictory interpretations of § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) as dicta. Id. at ^ 18 n. 10 (citing State 
v. McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, ffl| 17-21, 110 P.3d 149; State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 
982 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). It expressly avoided the issue of whether Utah law authorizes 
consecutive terms of probation. Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, j^ 19 n.l 1. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) consists of two parts connected by the 
disjunctive "or." By its plain language, the subsection grants the trial court discretion to 
terminate probation at any point during its lawful term, "or" upon completion of thirty-six 
months for felonies and class A misdemeanors, or twelve months for other misdemeanors 
and infractions. Should this Court find it necessary to resort to tools of statutory 
construction to divine the legislature's intent, a thirty-six month limitation is mandated 
because: (1) any other interpretation would render superfluous half of the provision; (2) 
legislative history contradicts the appeals court's interpretation of the provision; and, (3) 
public policy underlying the very purposes for probation is defeated by imposition of 
lengthy, unsupervised probation merely to enforce restitution obligations where, as here, 
treatment), was amended in 2005. The version current through 2005 is referenced herein 
unless otherwise indicated. 
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another provision already grants continuing jurisdiction to enforce restitution. The Court 
of Appeals' interpretation of section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) also runs counter to its prior 
holdings that the provision does indeed impose a thirty-six-month limitation on 
probation. 
Point II. By its plain language, the statute's thirty-six-month limitation on 
probation forecloses longer terms whether imposed as consecutive terms or otherwise. 
The section's thirty-six-month and twelve-month limitations apply to felony and 
misdemeanor "cases," and to other "misdemeanors" and "infractions"; i.e., to multiple 
convictions. The state argued in the Court of Appeals that probation is a "sentence," and 
thus multiple terms may be imposed consecutively. However, the statute that suggests 
probation may be considered a sentence is less specific and earlier enacted than other 
statues that evidence clear legislative intent that probation is to be imposed upon the 
suspension of a sentence. Further, the legislature has empowered the trial court to order 
probation to be modified or begun anew. If probation is a sentence, this power would 
violate substantive due process by removing any upper limitation on the sentence's 
duration. Likewise, the power to commence anew the probation term, or to modify the 
actual terms thereof, would violate double jeopardy protections against punishing the 




Whether section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) imposes a thirty-six-month limitation on 
probation following a felony conviction, and whether the legislature has authorized 
imposition of consecutive probation terms, are addressed in Points I and II, respectively. 
POINT I: SECTION 77-18-l(10)(aKi) IMPOSES A THIRTY-SIX-MONTH 
LIMITATION ON PROBATION UPON A FELONY CONVICTION. 
Section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) limits probation to thirty-six months upon a felony 
conviction. The section's plain language is addressed below in Section A. Legislative 
intent, as further clarified by tools of statutory construction, is discussed in Section B. 
A. The Plain Language of Section 77-18-l(10)(aKi) Imposes a Thirty-Six-Month 
Limitation. 
The goal of statutory construction is to carry out legislative intent. "A court's 
primary responsibility in interpreting a statute 'is to give effect to the intent of the 
legislature.'" Cullurn v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 857 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1993) (quoting 
American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984), overruled on other grounds 
State v. South, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996)). The provision's plain language is the most 
efficient means to identify legislative intent: 
To discern the legislature's intent and purpose, we look first to the "best 
evidence" of a statute's meaning, the plain language of the act. [Jensen v. 
IHC, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)]; see alsoy e.g., City ofHildale v. 
Cooke, 2001 UT 56, If 36, 28 P.3d 697; Hall v. Utah State Dep 't o/Corr., 
2001 UT 34, % 15, 24 P.3d 958. In reading the language of an act, 
moreover, we seek "to render all parts [of the statute] relevant and 
meaningful," Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 396 (Utah 1980), 
and we therefore "presume the legislature used each term advisedly and ... 
according to its ordinary meaning." Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 
872, 875 (Utah 1995). Consequently, we "avoid interpretations that will 
render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative." Hall, 2001 UT 34 at 
7 
Tf 15; see also, e.g., Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 
(Utah 1997). 
State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, ^ 10, 44 P.3d 680 (first set of brackets added, other 
brackets and ellipses in original). 
Only when the statutory language is ambiguous should a court turn to extrinsic 
tools of statutory interpretation. See id. "The fact that the parties offer differing 
constructions of the statute, in and of itself, does not mean that the statute is 
'ambiguous.'" Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). Rather, the provision is "ambiguous" only if it is susceptible to "two or more 
plausible meanings." Id. (citing ,4//v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 
(Utah 1993), quoting Village Inn Apts. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 790 P.2d 581, 583 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)). 
By its plain language, section 77-18-1 (10)(a)(i) authorizes the termination of 
probation any time during its lawfully prescribed duration, "or" upon completion of 
thirty-six months in felony and class A misdemeanor cases: 
Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or 
upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class 
A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors 
or infractions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10)(a)(i) (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added).2 
2
 To support its interpretation below, the Court of Appeals parsed the section's actual 
language as follows: "[probation may be terminated ... upon completion without 
violation of [thirty six] months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases." 
Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, If 17 n.7 (brackets and ellipses in original). 
8 
"Or," according to its ordinary meaning, is a disjunction. Webster's New World 
College Dictionary 413 (4th ed. 1999). A disjunction such as "or" implies a discrete 
choice or option. E.g., State v. Lowder, 889 P.2d 413, 413-14 (Utah 1994).3 This Court 
has consistently recognized the significance of the disjunctive "or" when used to separate 
clauses within a statute. E.g., Calhoun v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2004 UT 56, j^ 
20, 96 P.3d 916 (acknowledging the significance of the "legislature's separation of these 
two sections by the disjunctive 'or' as opposed to the conjunctive 'and,'"); In re 
Discipline ofBabilisf 951 P.2d 207, 215 (Utah 1997) (the disciplinary court erred because 
it failed to recognize that "[subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) [of Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct 4.2] are set off with the disjunctive 'or.' A finding under any one of the three is 
sufficient to establish disbarment as the presumptive sanction."); Lowder, 889 P.2d at 414 
(the "plain language [of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(1) (1994)] prohibits either the 
touching of a child's anus, buttocks or genitalia or the taking of indecent liberties with a 
child, if done with the intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily pain" (emphasis in 
original)); Hardy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 763 P.2d 761, 766 (Utah 1988) (an insurer need 
only prove one of the subparts of § 31-19-8(1) (1988) because they are read disjunctively 
due to their separation by "or" (citing Berger v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 
3
 Some opinions, e.g., Totorica v. Thomas, 397 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah 1965), have referred 
to "or" as a conjunction. This is partially correct because a conjunction effectively links 
two parts of a complex sentence. "And" is also a conjunction, but it typically functions 
not to create choices or alternatives, but rather to add items within a list. Paar v. Stubbs, 
2005 UT App 310, j^ 8, 117 P.3d 1079. Inconsistent use of grammatical terminology 
notwithstanding, this Court has consistently interpreted "or" as a disjunctive conjunction. 
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388, 390 (Utah 1986))); Totorica, 397 P.2d at 986 (use of "or" to divide terms within § 
38-1-11 (1965) implies "choice"). 
Read in its entirety, the plain meaning of section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) is that a court 
may terminate a defendant's probation anytime within its lawfully prescribed term, or at 
the end of thirty-six months for a felonies and class A misdemeanors. 
B. Tools of Statutory Construction Further Clarify Legislative Intent to 
Impose Thirty-Six-Month and Twelve-Month Limitations, 
The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) (Supp. 2005) makes 
clear that probation is limited to thirty-six months for a felony. The same result follows 
upon resort to tools of statutory construction. Three such tools are applied below. 
1. The Court of Appeals' interpretation of section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) renders 
half the provision superfluous. Section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) must be interpreted so as not 
to render superfluous the clause following "or." "This court... interprets statutes to give 
meaning to all parts, and avoids rendering portions of the statute superfluous." LKL 
Assocs. v. Farley, 2004 UT 51, If 7, 94 P.3d 279 (citing Labelle v. McKay Dee Hosp. Ctr., 
2004 UT 15,H 16, 89 P.3d 113). 
Section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) is comprised of two parts. First, "Probation may be 
terminated at any time at the discretion of the court"; second, "or upon completion 
without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 
months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
l(10)(a)(i) (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added). Reliance upon the first part to conclude there 
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exists no limitation to the duration of probation impermissibly renders superfluous the 
second part. 
The Court of Appeals edited actual section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) so that the two parts 
read as one, and the disjunctive "or" is deleted. Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, f 18 n.7 
(quoted supra, n.2). Thus would the Court of Appeals judicially repeal the second part of 
section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i)9 along with the legislature's thirty-six-month limitation set forth 
therein. 
2. Legislative history contradicts the Court of Appeals' interpretation of § 77-
18-l(10)(a)(i), The Court of Appeals cites the 1989 amendment of section 77-18-1 (7)(a) 
(subsequently recodified at § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) & (ii)) to support its holding that section 
77-18-1(10)(a)(i) does not impose a thirty-six-month probation limitation for felonies and 
class A misdemeanors. Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, f^ 18 n.8. The 1989 amendment, 
however, neither was intended to, nor had the effect of, undoing statutory limitations on 
probation. To the contrary, the 1989 amendment actually evidences the legislature's 
intent to limit the duration of probation. 
In State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988), the defendant violated the terms of 
his probation within the statutory probation period, but proceedings to revoke probation 
and impose the suspended sentence were not instituted until after the probation period had 
run. The defendant appealed the trial court's subsequent exercise of jurisdiction to revoke 
probation. Id. at 462-463. The state argued that the statute did not automatically 
terminate probation at 18 months (the limitation imposed in the statute as then written), 
and, based thereon, the trial court retained jurisdiction to impose the suspended sentence. 
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Id. at 463. This Court disagreed, holding that section §77-18-7(a) (Supp. 1987) did 
terminate probation at 18 months, after which the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke 
probation and impose the suspended sentence. Id. at 464-65. 
In 1988, when Green was decided, the probation limitation statute provided: 
Upon completion without violation of 18 months' probation in felony or 
class A misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B misdemeanor cases, the 
probation period shall be terminated, unless earlier terminated by the court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (7)(a) (Supp. 1987). 
One year later, the legislature redrafted the probation limitation section, using for 
the first time the language at issue herein: "Probation may be terminated at any time at 
the discretion of the court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C 
misdemeanors or infractions." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (7)(a) (Supp. 1989) (now 
codified at § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i)). The legislature also added language to Utah Code Ann. § 
77-18-l(7)(a) (now codified at § 77-18-l(10)(a)(ii)), to extend the trial court's jurisdiction 
to enforce payment of fines and restitution upon termination of probation. Significantly, 
if Green interpreted the pre-amendment statute to limit probation, and the legislature 
amended the statute intending to remove probation limitations, why did not the legislature 
delete the limitations? Instead of deleting the limitations, the legislature lengthened them. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (7)(a) (Supp. 1989) (now codified at § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i)). 
The Court of Appeals, in Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, f^ 18 n.8, focused upon the 
legislature's use of "may" in the 1989 amendment, and concluded therefrom that the 
legislature intended to remove mandatory statutory limitations on probation, thus 
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legislatively overruling Green. The Court of Appeals, however, offered no evidence of 
legislative history to bolster this conclusion. In fact, Representative Ellertson, who 
sponsored HB 314 (1989), explained on the floor that the 1989 amendment was intended 
(a) to extend the statutory maximum probation period for both felony and misdemeanor 
convictions, and (b) to provide a means for enforcing payment of restitution and fines 
upon the termination of probation. Floor debate (3d reading) on HB 314 before the full 
House (Feb. 16, 1989). This explains the 1989 amendment's lengthening of probation for 
felonies to 36 months. Whether or not in response to Green, HB 314 doubled the 
statutory maximum for probation, thus doubling the time during which probation might 
be revoked and a suspended sentence imposed. 
Again, had the legislature intended to eliminate statutory limitations on probation, 
it would have eliminated the limitations instead of redefining them. Interpreting the 
legislature's use of "may" in the amended provision as rendering the redefined limitations 
discretionary, as did the appeals court, means the legislators decreed as follows: We 
authorize probation of any length whatsoever; the trial court is granted discretion to 
terminate probation at any time - which may be, but does not have to be, at thirty-six 
months for some convictions and twelve months for others, because while we extended 
those limits, we mean them to be void of any actual substance or enforceability. Such a 
construction is to be avoided so as not to "render some part of a provision nonsensical or 
absurd." State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, If 14, 122 P.3d 615 (quoting Millett v. Clark Clinic 
Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980)). 
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3. The Wallace decision causes a significant shift in public policy best left to 
the legislature. Interpreting section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) as not limiting the duration of 
probation runs counter to two important public policies. Public policy considerations may 
guide this Court's interpretation of a statute with unclear language. See Eaquinta v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 2005 UT 78, Tf 13, 125 P.3d 901 (citing Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1, 4 
(Utah 1996)). 
The first is public resources. Until Wallace issued, section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) was 
understood to limit the period of probation a sentencing court could impose. E.g., State v. 
Denny, 776 P.2d 91, 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert denied 779 P.2d 688 (1989); 
Robinson, 860 P.2d at 982; McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, \ 19. Of course, once a 
defendant successfully completes probation, the defendant no longer requires intensive, 
time consuming monitoring and supervision. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8), 
(12), (13), (15), (16) (Supp. 2005) (setting forth legal processes and potential terms of 
probation, each of which entails supervision and the expenditure of financial resources). 
If this Court concludes no limitation on probation exists, then suddenly even class B and 
C misdemeanants, along with those convicted of infractions, will be subject to years upon 
years of probation - and the additional costs of monitoring, supervision, and additional 
legal proceedings. The legislature is presumed to be aware of current case law. E.g., 
Theurer v. Board of Review, Indus. Com'n of Utah, Dept. of Employment Sec, 725 P.2d 
1338, 1343 (Utah 1986). Based upon current case law, such as Denny, 116 P.2d at 93; 
Robinson, 860 P.2d at 982; and, McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, *{ 19, the legislature would 
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not have budgeted for the additional drain on resources stemming from longer probation 
periods. 
The second consideration goes to the very purpose of probation. In Utah, the 
reason probation exists is to promote rehabilitation and the defendant's productive 
integration into society: 
[T]he purpose [of probation] is reform and rehabilitation: to give the 
defendant a chance, as the word 'probation' implies, to prove himself. For 
this purpose the defendant is required to agree to specified standards of 
conduct; and his continued liberty is dependent upon compliance with them. 
McPhie v. Turner, 351 P.2d 91, 92 (Utah 1960) (quoting Baine v. Beckstead, 347 P.2d 
554, 557 (Utah 1959)). Compare Model Penal Code § 7.01(3) (1962) (probation is 
appropriate where the defendant "is in need of the supervision, guidance, assistance or 
direction that the probation service can provide"). 
The flexibility trial courts possess in defining the terms of probation certainly is a 
major reason why probation is so widely employed as an alternative to sentencing. Even 
so, the determination of "how much time" should be based upon an objective analysis of 
the purpose for which die sentence has been suspended and probation imposed. Wayne 
A. Logan, The Importance of Purpose in Probation Decision Making, 7 Buff. Crim. L.R. 
171, 173 (2003). See also Am. Probation and Parole Assoc, Probation Pre-Sentence 
Investigation (1987), atwww.appa-net.org/about%20appa/probatiol.htm (recommended 
terms "should be designed to assist the probationer in leading a law-abiding life. They 
should be reasonably related to the avoidance of further criminal behavior.... They 
should not be so vague or ambiguous as to give no real guidance."). 
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The trial court in Wallace imposed the unusually long 144-month probation for no 
stated reason other than to prolong the court's jurisdiction to enforce restitution payments. 
(R. 415, at 11:3-18, quoted supra, Statement of Facts; contrast R. 411 at 2 (Presentence 
Investigation Report recommends only thirty-six months).) The trial court apparently was 
unaware that another provision already extends jurisdiction for the specific purpose of 
enforcing restitution obligations - made applicable upon the expiration of probation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2005). 
If section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) is interpreted as imposing no limit upon probation, the 
trial court could effectively render a defendant a ward of the state for as long as the court 
deemed appropriate without any objective purpose served thereby. Maintaining Mr. 
Wallace, or any defendant, under many years of probation runs counter to the ideal of 
allowing the probationer to either stand on her/his own, or, if unable to do so, suffer 
imposition of the suspended sentence. (It may also violate a defendant's substantive due 
process rights by removing any upward limitation upon her/his potential sentence, as 
discussed infra, Point 11(B)(2).) 
4. The Court of Appeals interpreted section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) in violation of its 
own precedent The Court of Appeals' interpretation of section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) 
violates its own precedent established in Denny, Robinson, and McDonald. In each of 
these cases, the appeals court was ultimately required to determine the maximum 
permissible length of probation; and, in so doing, relied upon the limits now codified at 
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section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i). Denny, 776 P.2d at 93; Robinson, 860 P.2d at 982; McDonald, 
2005UTApp86,U19.4 
POINT II: UTAH LAW DOES NOT AUTHORIZE IMPOSITION OF 
CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF PROBATION. 
Consecutive terms of probation may not be imposed for multiple convictions. The 
plain language of section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) is discussed below in Section A. That 
probation does not constitute a "sentence," which, under state law, may be run 
consecutively, is addressed in Section B.5 
A. The Plain Language of Section 77-18-l(10)(a)(D Prohibits Imposition of 
Consecutive Terms of Probation. 
The plain language of section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) evidences clear legislative intent to 
cap probation at thirty-six months for felonies and class A misdemeanors, and twelve 
months for other misdemeanors and infractions. 
This Court's strives to interpret a statute to reflect legislative intent as evidenced 
by the statute's plain language. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, ^ 10. In so doing, this Court 
"presume[s] the legislature used each term advisedly and ... according to its ordinary 
4
 The Court of Appeals, in Wallace, 2005 UT App. 434, If 18 n.10, refers to its actual 
application of probation limitations in Robinson and McDonald as dicta. Its application 
of those limits, however, was necessary to each holding and, therefore, was not dicta. 
See, e.g., Parkinson v. State Bank, 35 P.2d 814, 819 (Utah 1934) (language unnecessary 
to a decision or interpretation of a statute is dicta). 
5
 Important to note is that the trial court did not unambiguously impose consecutive terms 
of probation upon Mr. Wallace. The Court of Appeals upheld the 144-month probation as 
a single term allowable because, it concluded, section 77-18-1 (10)(a)(i) does not impose a 
thirty-six-month limitation. Wallace, UT App 434, Tf 18 & nn. 8, 10. The appeals court 
expressly avoided the consecutive term issue. Id. at <f 19 n.l 1. Thus, even if this Court 
finds that Utah law authorizes imposition of consecutive terms of probation, Mr. 
Wallace's 144-month probation must be vacated, and a thirty-six month maximum 
imposed. See Reply Brief of Appellant, at 16-20. 
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meaning." Id. (citing Nelson, 905 P.2d at 875). With regard to its own statutes, the 
legislature directs, "Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and 
the approved usage of the language...." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11 (2004). 
1. Section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) limits probation to thirty-six or twelve months no 
matter how the period is calculated or imposed. The plain language of the second part 
of section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) dictates that probation, however it is calculated or imposed, 
must terminate at either thirty-six or twelve months. 
As discussed, supra, Point I, section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i)) effectively reads: If 
probation has not already been terminated pursuant to the trial court's discretion, it shall 
be terminated "upon completion without violation of thirty-six months probation in felony 
or class A misdemeanor cases, or twelve months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or 
infractions." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) (Supp. 2005). The legislature does not 
qualify in any way the application of the thirty-six and twelve month limitations with 
reference to consecutive terms of probation. Simply put, "probation" ends upon reaching 
the limitations imposed by the legislature. 
Moreover, pursuant to codified rules of construction, a statutory term may be read 
in the plural. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(b) (2004) ("[t]he singular number includes the 
plural, and the plural the singular." As applied to the second part of section 77-18-
l(10)(a)(i), even probations, i.e., multiple terms of probation, must be terminated at 
thirty-six or twelve months, depending upon the underlying convictions. 
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2. The terms "cases," "misdemeanors," and "infractions" in section 77-18-
l(10)(a)(i) also constitute plain language evidencing the legislature's intent to restrict 
probation to thirty-six or twelve months. The legislature clearly intends that the 
statutory limitations apply to felony and class A misdemeanor "cases," as well as to other 
"misdemeanors" and "infractions" - all in the plural. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) 
(Supp. 2005). Thus no matter how many felonies, misdemeanors, or infractions a 
defendant is convicted of, any subsequent probation still is limited by statute. 
The singular-includes-the-plural rule of section 68-3-12(b) further reinforces this 
interpretation of section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i). The legislature must be charged with 
knowledge of its own statutes. Thus it knows that, absent a clear indication to the 
contrary, "cases," "misdemeanors" and "infractions" will, in any event, be interpreted to 
include the plural of each. Add to this the legislature's presumed knowledge of case law 
interpreting its statutes - specifically including declarations that concurrent sentences are 
favored over consecutive ones. State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, % 43, 52 P.3d 451 
(citing State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998)). Given these presumptions against 
imposition of consecutive probation terms, the legislature must also have known that clear 
authorization to impose consecutive terms was required if indeed that were its intent. The 
plain language of section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) suggests no such authorization, clear or 
otherwise. 
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B. Because Probation Is Not a "Sentence," Statutes that Authorize Imposition of 
Consecutive Sentences Do Not Apply. 
A sentence imposed following conviction is not the same as probation; probation is 
imposed only upon a sentence's suspension. In other words, probation simply is not a 
sentence. Following a general explanation, Subsection 1 establishes that a statute listing 
probation along with other post-trial sentences does not change the character of probation. 
Subsection 2 establishes that if probation were construed as a sentence, it would lead to 
violations of both substantive due process and double jeopardy protections, and it would 
cause conflict within Utah's laws. 
Probation provides a disposition option when the court first imposes a sentence, 
and then suspends it: "On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or 
convictions of any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the 
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation." Utah Code Ann. § 77-
18-l(2)(a) (Supp. 2005). Moreover, upon revocation of probation, "the defendant shall be 
sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed." Id. § 77-18-
l(12)(e)(iii). These provisions make clear that a "sentence" is distinct and stands apart 
from "probation." See also Black's Law Dictionary 1368 (7th ed. 1999) {"suspended 
sentence. A sentence postponed so that the defendant is not required to serve time unless 
he or she commits another crime or violates some other court-imposed condition -A 
suspended sentence, in effect, is a form of probation" (emphasis added) 
The legislature has defined probation in terms connoting anything but punishment 
or a sentence: "'Probation' is an act of grace by the court suspending the imposition or 
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execution of a convicted offender's sentence upon prescribed conditions." Utah Code 
Ann. §77-27-1(10) (2003). 
Utah courts have also acknowledged the fundamental difference between serving 
probation and serving a sentence not suspended. Montoya v. Sibbett, 2003 UT App 398, 
ffl[ 14-16, 81 P.3d 797 (distinguishing time served in the State Hospital on probation, for 
which credit for time served need not be applied to a sentence later reimposed, from time 
served in the State Hospital under sentence, for which credit must be granted); Raw lings 
v Holden, 869 P.2d 958, 961 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (time spent at the State Hospital as 
probation is just that, probation, as distinct from a sentence). 
The distinction between an actual sentence versus probation is important. The 
state argued below that section 76-3-401 "authorizes a court 'to impose concurrent or 
consecutive sentences.'" Brief of Appellee at 49 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 
(2003)). Probation is listed as a "sentence," along with fines, removal from office, 
imprisonment, life imprisonment, and death," in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) (2003). 
Brief of Appellee at 49. Only section 76-3-201(2) suggests that probation may constitute 
a sentence. 
1. Section 76-3-201(2) is preempted by section 77-18-1. Where two statutes 
conflict, the more specific and later enacted controls. Dimmitt v. City Court of Salt Lake 
City, 21 Utah 2d 257, 444 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1968) (citing Bateman v. Bd. of 
Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381 (Utah 1958); Pacific Intermountain Express Co. 
v. State Tax Comm % 7 Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d 549 (Utah 1957)). While ascertaining 
legislative intent from a statute's plain language remains the review court's first objective, 
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when statutes conflict, their respective specificity is key to deciding which to apply. 
Taghipour v. Jerez, 2002 UT 74, T| 11, 52 P.3d 1252 (citing Jensen v. IHCHosps., Inc., 
988 P.2d 327, 331 (Utah 1997); Hall v. State Dep't ofCorr., 2001 UT 34, U 15, 27 P.3d 
958)). 
The statute relied upon by the state includes probation as one of six potential 
"sentences." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(2)(a)-(f) (2003) (Addendum D). It addresses 
neither what probation is, nor when, why or how it may be imposed, revoked, modified, 
continued, or begun anew. Rather it sets forth definitions generally applicable to Title 76, 
chapter 3, part 2 of the Utah Code. It generally addresses how restitution may be 
calculated, and which sentence is appropriate when an offense is subject to sentences of 
varying severity. Id. 
Section 77-18-1 (Addendum F), by contrast, focuses entirely upon the court's 
options upon a sentence's suspension, especially focusing upon every aspect of probation. 
Subsection (2), quoted, supra, declares that probation may be imposed upon suspension 
of a sentence, and discusses which entities may supervise a probationer, as well as the 
trial court's retention of jurisdiction over probationers. Subsections (3)-(7) detail the 
process guiding disposition of a defendant whose sentence is suspended. Subsections (8) 
and (11)-(16) focus upon what and why particular probation terms are appropriate. 
Subsections (11)-(12) detail the reasons for, and the process by which, probation may be 
revoked, modified, continued, or commenced anew. Subsection (10) dictates when 
probation must be terminated, and, along with subsection (9), discusses technical aspects 
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of restitution collection and enforcement. Section 77-18-1 clearly is the nuts-and-bolts 
statute that details all that follows the suspension of a sentence, particularly probation. 
To the extent this Court considers the statutes' respective enactment dates relevant 
to resolving the statutes' incongruities, see Dimmitt, 444 P.2d at 464, section 76-3-201 
was enacted in 1973, and last amended in 2003. Section 77-18-1 was enacted in 1980, 
and last amended in 2005. 
Of note, section 77-27-1, which defines probation as "an act of grace by the court 
suspending the imposition or execution of a convicted offender's sentence," was also 
enacted in 1980. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1(10) (2003). Thus, seven years after 
including probation in a laundry list of potential sentences, the legislature made clear its 
intent that probation constitute an alternative to a punitive sentence - one imposed only 
after suspension of the sentence. The legislature drew a clear line between sentences and 
probation no later than 1980. 
2. Interpreting probation as a sentence leads to constitutional violations and 
conflict with other statutes. To give effect to the legislature's intent, this Court 
considers a statute's context and subject matter when interpreting an ambiguity: "'One of 
the cardinal principles of statutory construction is that the courts will look to the reason, 
spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire context and subject matter of 
the statute dealing with the subject.'" In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ^ j 23, 1 
P.3d 1074 (quoting Mountain States Tel & and Tel Co, v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464, 466 
(Utah 1989) (citation omitted)). AccordUtah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(1), (2) (2004) (usual 
rules of statutory construction and definitions codified in section 68-3-12 do not apply if 
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resulting interpretation is "inconsistent with the manifest intent of the Legislature, or 
repugnant to the context of the statute"). Similarly, this Court has "'a duty to construe a 
statute whenever possible so as to effectuate legislative intent and avoid and/or save it 
from constitutional conflicts or infirmities.'" Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ^ 23 (quoting State 
v. Bell 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989)). 
To equate probation with a post-trial sentence subjects the probationer to a 
sentence of indefinite length in violation of substantive due process protections. In 
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), the Court found that confinement to restore 
competency violates a defendant's due process rights where nothing in the law limits the 
confinement's potential length. Montoya, 2003 UT App 398, fflf 8, 12. In Utah, a 
probationer may be confined in a treatment facility, jail or place of residence. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-l(8)(a)(iv)-(vi) (Supp. 2005); see Rawlings, 869 P.2d at 961 (discussing 
potential conditions of probation). Crucial to this discussion, the trial court may, at any 
time prior to its expiration, order that "the entire probation term commence anew." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(e)(ii) (Supp. 2005). 
Precisely because probation is not punishment, but rather an "act of grace by the 
court suspending the imposition or execution of a convicted offender's sentence," Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-17-1(10) (2003), the Board of Pardons and Parole need not grant credit 
for time served on probation against a sentence later imposed upon probation's 
revocation, even when probation entails confinement. Montoya, 2003 UT App 398, ffl| 
14-17 (discussing Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738-39; Rawlings, 869 P.2d at 959-62). To 
interpret probation as used in section 77-18-1 as a post-trial sentence would require 
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invalidation of section 77-18-1(12)(e)(ii) (court empowered to order probation 
commenced "anew") as a violation of substantive due process protections because it 
would authorize sentences of infinite length. 
To interpret probation as a post-trial sentence would ultimately violate double 
jeopardy protections. The Utah and federal constitutions prohibit multiple punishments 
for the same offense. U.S. Const, amend. V; Utah Const, art I, § 12; State v. Dyer, 671 
P.2d 142, 146 (Utah 1983) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,717 (1969) 
(Douglas, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 
(1989) (quoting United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 306, 307 (1931))). A sentence once 
imposed and later increased also violates the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 730-31. 
Double jeopardy concerns have guided the string of opinions requiring merger of 
Utah's habitual criminal sentencing enhancement with the underlying felony sentence. 
These opinions recognize that imposing a second sentence for criminal conduct already 
punished would be improper. E.g., State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 145 (Utah 1989); see 
also Smith, 2005 UT 57, f^ 7 (merger is a doctrine crafted to avoid violation of double 
jeopardy protections). This Court has held that the habitual criminal statute must be 
considered an enhancement, not a separate sentence, in part to avoid improperly 
punishing the defendant twice for the same conduct. E.g. Stilling, 770 P.2d at 145 & 
n.46. Of the opinions relied upon in Stilling, 770 P.2d at 145 n.46, one succinctly 
observes, "'The effect of two sentences would be tantamount to sentencing a defendant 
for being an ex-convict. Separate sentences would violate the double jeopardy 
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prohibition.'" Schuler v. State, 668 P.2d 1333, 1340 (Wyo. 1983) (quoting Evans v. 
State, 655 P.2d 1214, 1225 (Wyo. 1982)). 
If probation were considered a sentence, the imposition of said sentence would 
follow imposition and suspension of the initial sentence. In effect, the court would 
impose one sentence, suspend it in such a way that it may be re-imposed, and then 
impose a second, stand-alone sentence. Revocation of probation and re-imposition of the 
suspended sentence then would constitute imposition of two sentences for the same 
offense. More problematic still, if probation were considered a sentence, then any 
extension of probation pursuant to, for example, section 77-18-l(12)(e)(ii), would 
constitute additional punishment for the same offense. Under either scenario, the 
defendant would suffer multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of double 
jeopardy protections. 
Probation must also be defined in context with other statutes. See In re Marriage 
of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, Tf 23; see also Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(1), (2) (2004). 
Defining probation as a sentence would run counter to the statutes enacted in 1980: 
section 77-18-l(2)(a) (probation is imposed upon the sentence's suspension); and, section 
77-27-1(10) (probation is an "act of grace by the court suspending the imposition ... of a 
sentence"). Thus, when considered in context with other statutes, any definition of 
probation as a sentence is impermissible. 
Finally, to interpret Utah law as authorizing consecutive terms of probation would 
create conflict with probation's "reason, spirit, and sense." See In re Marriage of 
Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, % 23 (quoting Mountain States Tel. & and Tel Co. v. Payne, 782 
26 
P.2d at 466). In Utah, probation exists to promote rehabilitation and the defendant's 
productive integration into society. McPhie, 351 P.2d at 92. Merely prolonging 
probation, for example, to enforce restitution obligations, conflicts with the very reason 
and spirit underlying probation. 
CONCLUSION 
The plain language of section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) limits a term of probation to thirty-
six months for felonies and class A misdemeanors, and twelve months for other 
misdemeanors and infractions. Likewise clear is legislative intent to prohibit imposition 
of consecutive probation terms. 
Mr. Wallace's 144-month probation term is invalid because it exceeds the thirty-
six-month limitation for felonies. In the alternative, if this Court decides the legislature 
authorized imposition of consecutive terms of probation, Mr. Wallace's 144-month term 
must still be vacated and a thirty-six month term imposed in its place because the trial 
court provided no clear indication of its intent to impose consecutive terms of probation. 
DATED this {Q_ day of April, 2006. 
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OPINION 
DAVIS, Judge: 
**1 Gerald Steven Wallace appeals his conviction for various violations of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act (UUSA). See Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 to -30 (2000 & 
Supp.2002). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
**2 These criminal proceedings arise out, of a Ppnzi scheme called "The Program." [FN1] 
Defendant learned of The Program from Al Anderson and Paul Stewart. Stewart claimed 
to be able to earn commissions by facilitating money transfers from banks with surplus 
cash reserves to banks with insufficient cash reserves. To facilitate these transfers, 
however, Stewart asserted that he needed to have a certain amount of money on deposit 
with the bank. 
FN1. A Ponzi scheme is a "fraudulent investment scheme in which money 
contributed by later investors generates artificially high dividends for the original 
investors, whose example attracts even larger investments.'1 Black's Law Dictionary 1180 
(7th ed. 1999). 
**3 Between August 2000 and March 2001, Defendant purchased at least three homes in 
the state of Utah. The purchase of each nome was conditioned upon the seller agreeing to 
reinvest a portion of the proceeds from the sale (in each case at least $200,000) in an 
attorney trust account, which was initially held at Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund. 
Stewart claimed that he would use the trtist account money to facilitate the bank transfers 
and to pay interest to the trust account *26l beneficiaries from his commissions. [FN2] In 
fact, Stewart was embezzling funds from the trust account, and each of the three sellers 
lost their principal investment and received very little,4 if any, interest. 
FN2. The account would purportedly pay interest to the, seller at a fixed rate for two years 
and then return the principal to the seller. The account supposedly generated enough 
interest to pay not just the seller's interest, but also to pay the buyer's mortgage. 
**4 The State charged Defendant with selling unregistered securities, see Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 61-1-7 (2000), -21 (Supp.2002), and selling securities without a license, see id 
§§ 61-l-3(l)-(2) (2000), -21 (Supp.2002). In support thereof, the State offered evidence 
at trial that The Program was not registered as a security, nor was Defendant licensed to 
sell securities. Defendant, on the other hand, claims innocence because the record 
contains no evidence that he knew he was,selling securities. 
**5 The State also charged Defendant with securities fraud. See id. §§61-1-1(2) (2000), -
21 (Supp.2002). In support thereof, the State offered evidence at trial that Defendant 
failed to disclose several facts about The Program and those administering it, including 
that: (1) Defendant declared bankruptcy in 1998, (2) Anderson was convicted of a felony 
in 1986, (3) a lawsuit was filed in 2000 against Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund and 
others involved in The Program, (4) Stewart received a cease-and-desist order from the 
Utah Division of Securities in 2000, and (5) there were certain risks involved in The 
Program. In his defense, Defendant argued that he was unaware of the pending legal 
troubles of Stewart and Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund, and that he did not know that 
his bankruptcy and Anderson's felony conviction were relevant. Defendant also testified 
that, contrary to their testimony, he did disclose the risks of The Program to the sellers. 
[FN3] 
FN3. Defendant was also charged with engaging in £ pattern of unlawful activity 
(racketeering), see Utah Code Ann. §§76-10-1601 to-
1609 (1999 & Supp.2002), which he does not address.on appeal. 
**6 Defendant was convicted by a jury on all counts. The trial court sentenced Defendant 
to consecutive prison terms for each count, but suspended the prison terms. The trial 
court placed Defendant on probation for, 144 months and ordered $626,000 in restitution. 
[FN4] Defendant obtained new counsel and filed a timely notice of appeal. 
FN4. As part of probation, the trial court also barred Defendant from acting as a fiduciary 
or participating in any real estate transactions except for purchasing or selling a personal 
residence. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
**7 Although Defendant characterizes his arguments as challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence, Defendant is actually challenging the trial court's definition of willfulness, 
which was taken from a statute and was given to the jury in the form of an instruction. 
"The correct interpretation of a statute is a question of law and is reviewed for 
correctness." State v Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). 
**8 Based on the definition of willfulness that Defendant now argues is appropriate, 
Defendant also claims that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence that his 
violations of UUSA were willful, and
 tthat his counsel at trial was ineffective because he 
failed to preserve this issue at trial. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we 
will "uphold the [jury's] decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that 
can reasonably be drawn from it, we conclude that some evidence exists from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt." State v Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989). "Where, as here, a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on appeal without a 
prior evidentiary hearing, it presents a question of law." State v Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 
542 (Utah Ct.App.1998). However, "appellate review of counsel's performance must be 
highly deferential; otherwise the distorting effects of hindsight would produce too great a 
temptation for courts to second-guess, trial counsel's performance on the basis of an 
inanimate record." Id (quotations and citations omitted). 
*262 **9 Defendant finally assert? on appeal that his 144-month probation violates Utah 
law. The illegality of a sentence is a question of law, which we review for correctness. 
See State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah CtApp.1991). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Sufficiency of Evidence 
**10 Defendant argues that the State presented insufficient evidence of his willful intent 
to commit securities violations. In support thereof, ^Defendant challenges the trial court's 
definition of willfulness. The jury was, instructed that 
[a] defendant acts willfully if it was his conscious objjective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result—not that it was the defendant's conscious desire or objective 
to violate the law, nor that the defendant knew that he was committing fraud in the sale of 
the security. 
Although Defendant did not object to^this instruction at trial, he now argues that the 
instruction and resultant convictions were erroneous. [FN5] We disagree. 
FN5. Under rule 19(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, "[u]nless a party objects 
to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, ,the instruction may not be assigned 
as error except to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah R.Crim. P. 19(e). The term "manifest 
injustice" is synonymous with the "plain error" standard, wherein an appellant must show 
that an error occurred, the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and the error 
was harmful. See State v. Casey 2003 UT 5 5 , ^ 40-41, 82 P.3d 1106. Here, no error 
occurred. 
** 11 Before beginning our analysis, it is necessary to briefly review the statutes at issue 
in this case. Defendant was charged with one count of selling a security without a license, 
see Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3(1)- (2) (2000) (stating that it is unlawful to act as a broker-
dealer or an agent of a broker-dealer in Utah without a license), one count of selling an 
unregistered security, see id. § 61-1-7 (2000) (stating that it is unlawful to offer or sell a 
security in Utah unless it is registered), and three counts of securities fraud, see id. §61-
1-1(2) (2000) (stating that it is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer or 
sale of any security, to "make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact"). However, violations of these statutes are not criminal unless they are done 
"willfully." Id. § 61-1-21(1), (2) (Supp.2002). While the UUSA does not define 
"willfully," Utah's Criminal Code states that a person engages in conduct willfully "when 
it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Id. § 
76-2-103(1) (1999). 
** 12 Defendant claims that the State failed to introduce evidence that his sale of 
securities without a license and that his sale of unregistered securities were willful, 
arguing that "[t]he record contains absolutely no evidence that [Defendant] believed he 
was selling securities." However, ignorance of the law is not a defense to a crime. See id. 
§ 76-2-304 (1999). Furthermore, while no Utah case has directly addressed this issue, the 
majority of jurisdictions have rejected arguments that a defendant can avoid criminal 
liability for selling securities without a license and selling unregistered securities by 
claiming ignorance. See, e.g., Bayhi v. State, 629 So.2d 782, 789 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) 
("A specific criminal intent or guilty knowledge that the law is being violated is not 
required to find criminal violations of those sections of the Alabama Securities Act 
prohibiting the sale of unregistered securities and requiring registration as a securities 
dealer ...." (internal citations omitted)); People v. Terranova, 38 Colo.App. 476, 563 P.2d 
363, 367 (1976) (holding that scienter nged not be shown with regard to the sale of 
securities without a license and sale of unregistered securities); State v. Andresen, 256 
Conn. 313, 773 A.2d 328, 346 (2001) (citing twelve jurisdictions, the court stated "[w]e 
hold, as have the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, that the offense of wilfully 
selling unregistered securities requires proof only that the defendant intended to do the 
act prohibited by the statute"); State v, Montgomery, 135 Idaho 348, 17 P.3d 292, 295 
(2001) ("[W]e join the majority of courts that have found scienter is not required for 
violations of the securities registration and licensing requirements."); Clarkson v. State, 
486 N.E.2d 501, 507 (Ind.1985) (affirming convictions for selling unregistered securities 
and *263 selling securities without being a registered agent, the court stated "whether 
[defendant] was aware of the Indiana securities laws is of no moment"); State v. Dumke, 
901 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Mo.Ct.App.1995) ("To sustain a conviction under the statute 
[governing registration of securities and security agents], it is not necessary to find that 
the accused realized his conduct was in violation of registration requirements."); State v. 
Irons, 254 Neb. 18, 574 N.W.2d 144, 150 (1998) ("Knowledge by a defendant that the 
item sold is a security is not required in order to convict under the registration provisions 
of the Uniform Securities Act."); State v. Sheets, 94 N.M. 356, 610 P.2d 760, 770 
(Ct.App.1980) (rejecting defendant's contention that, in order to commit the crime of 
selling unregistered securities, one must have knowledge that the item being sold is a 
security); State v. Goetz, 312 N.W.2d T, 12-13 (N.D.1981) (finding persuasive federal 
and state cases that hold actual knowledge that a security is being sold in violation of the 
law is not an element of a willful violation of securities laws). Quite simply, knowledge 
by Defendant that the items sold were securities was not required to convict him of 
willfully violating Utah Code section 61-1-3(1) and (2) and Utah Code section 61-1-7. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-l-3(l)-(2), -7. 
**13 Defendant also challenges his securities fraud conviction, see id. §§ 61-1-1(2), -21, 
arguing that the evidence of willfulness was insufficient because he acted in "good faith" 
and had an "honest" belief that The Program was legitimate. However, Utah courts have 
refused to read scienter into section 61-1-1(2), see State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1360 
(Utah 1993), but have instead held that willfulness "does not require an intent to violate 
the law or to injure another or acquire any advantage," id. at 1358 n. 3. "The legislature 
has indicated that a person acts willfully when it is his or her 'desire to engage in the 
conduct that cause[s] the result/ " Id. at 1358 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103) 
(alteration in original). Therefore, "[t]o act willfully in this context means to act 
deliberately and purposefully, as distinguished from merely accidentally or 
inadvertently." Id. at 1358 n. 3. 
**14 Here, Defendant contends that he did not act "deliberately and purposefully," id, 
because he did not know about the pending legal troubles of Stewart and Attorney's Title 
Guarantee Fund and because he did not know that his bankruptcy and Anderson's felony 
conviction were material. In effect, Defendant is asking us to hold that, to convict him of 
willfully committing securities fraud, the State was required to prove that he knew of the 
information that he failed to disclose (even though
 2he did not investigate the legitimacy 
of The Program) and that he knew that such information was material. 
**15 We need not reach these issues. [FN6] Regardless of Defendant's knowledge 
regarding the other issues, Defendant concedes that he knew of the risks of The Program, 
and he does not argue that he believed tliat such information was not material. Instead, 
Defendant simply argues that, "contrary to the sellers' testimonies, he disclosed the risks 
to investors." Here, the jury may simply have believed the sellers' testimony over 
Defendant's. See Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987) (stating that 
a trier of fact "is entitled to give conflicting opinions whatever weight he or she deems 
appropriate"). Although the State alleged la number of material misrepresentations and 
omissions, one material misrepresentation or omission alone (like Defendant's failure to 
disclose the risks of The Program to each of the three sellers) may be the basis for a 
securities fraud conviction. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2) (making it unlawful to 
"make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact" 
(emphases added)). 
FN6. Although we do not reach the questions posited by Defendant, we encourage the 
legislature to address these issues. 
**16 We will reverse a jury's guilty verdict only if "the evidence and its inferences are so 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." 
*264 State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (quotations and citation 
omitted). Thus, "so long as some evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's 
findings, we will not disturb them." Id. Here, the State specifically offered evidence that 
The Program was not registered as a security and that Defendant was not licensed to sell 
securities. The State also elicited testimony from each of the sellers that Defendant failed 
to disclose the risks of The Program. Clearly, "some evidence and reasonable inferences 
support the jury's findings," id., and we therefore affirm the convictions. Because we 
have determined that the State introduced sufficient evidence that Defendant's violations 
of UUSA were willful, the failure by Defendant's trial counsel to preserve this issue does 
not constitute ineffective assistance. See State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96,134, 989 P.2d 52 
("[T]he failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if raised 
does not constitute ineffective assistance." (alteration in original) (quotations and citation 
omitted)). 
II. Probation 
**17 Defendant claims that the trial courtjmposed an illegal sentence when it suspended 
his prison term and placed him on probation for 144 months, arguing that Utah Code 
section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) limits probation to thirty-six months. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-
18-1(10)(a)(i) (2003). [FN7] We disagree. 
FN7. Under Utah Code section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i), "[probation may be terminated ... upon 
completion without violation of [thirty-six] months probation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases." Utah Code Ann. § 77- 18-l(10)(a)(i) (2003). 
**18 When construing the language of a statutory provision, we "presume that the 
legislature used each word advisedly" and "will not infer substantive terms into the text 
that are not already there." Associated Gen Contractors v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 
2001 UT 112,1f 30, 38 P.3d 291 (quotations and citations omitted). The trial court's 
authority to suspend a sentence and impose probation is found in Utah Code section 77-
18-1(2), which states that on "conviction of any crime or offense, the court may, after 
imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on 
probation." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(2)(a). Nothing in that section limits the court's 
right to impose probation to a maximum of only thirty-six months. And section 77-18-
l(10)(a)(i) simply states that a court "may" terminate probation upon completion of 
thirty-six months probation, so long as no violation has occurred within that time. See id. 
§ 77-18- l(10)(a)(i). Utah courts have long interpreted the word "may" as permissive, not 
restrictive. See, e g, Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38,Tf 25, 48 P.3d 895 
(interpreting an insurance policy stating that the insurance company "may take any 
appropriate action," the court concluded that the parties used the word "may" "to set forth 
their intention that [the insurance company] has the option to take appropriate action, but 
is not required to do so"); State v. Mclntyre, 92 Utah 177, 66 P.2d 879, 881 (1937) 
(ff[T]he word 'may* imports permission, privilege, liberty to do, lack of restraint, a grant 
of opportunity or power. It is never properly used in a denial, a restriction, or a 
limitation...."). [FN8] Therefore, the trial court here certainly has discretion to terminate 
Defendant's probation after thirty-six months (so long as no violations have occurred 
within that time), [FN9] but is *265 not required to limit probation to that time frame. 
[FN10] 
FN8. The legislature has also expressed its intent that Utah Code section 77-18-
l(10)(a)(i) be read as permissive rather than restrictive. In State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 
(Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the predecessor to section 77-18-
l(10)(a)(i), which stated " '[u]pon completion without violation of [eighteen] months 
probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases,... the offender shall be terminated 
from sentence: " Id. at 464 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 77-18- l(10)(a) (Supp.1984)). The 
court determined that the term "shall" was a strong legislative mandate that required 
probation to terminate after eighteen months. See id In 1989, less than one year after 
Green was decided, the Utah legislature amended the statute's relevant language to use 
the term "may" instead of "shall." Compare Utah Code Ann. § 77- 18-l(7)(a) 
(Supp.1988) with id § 77-18-l(7)(a) (Supp. 1989) (current version at id § 77-18-
l(10)(a)(i)(2003)). 
FN9. As one of the terms of probation, Defendant is required to pay restitution in the 
amount of $626,000 (jointly and severally with other defendants involved in The 
Program) pursuant to a payment plan. 
FN 10. We are not bound by cases which^ in dicta, assume without deciding that Utah 
Code section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) creates maximum probationary periods. See, e g, State v 
McDonald, 2005 UT App 86,1fl[ 17-21, 110 P.3d 149; State v Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 
982 (Utah Ct.App. 1993). 
** 19 It should also be noted that Defendant here did not have to accept the terms of his 
probation. See State v. Allmendmger, 565 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Utah 1977) ("If the defendant 
does not like the terms prescribed by the court, he does not have to accept them. And if 
he does agree to the terms set forth, he should abide by them.") Defendant was convicted 
of four second degree felonies (each carrying a OAQ- to fifteen-year sentence) and two 
third degree felonies (each carrying a zero- to five-year sentence), creating a potential 
range of incarceration from four to seventy years. In the judge's own words, had 
Defendant accepted incarceration over probation, he would have "conceivably and 
realistically been spending the rest of [hi§] life in prison." But Defendant did not choose 
incarceration. He chose probation and thereby accepted its terms. Having accepted its 
terms, he now must abide by them. See id [FN11] 
FNl 1. Defendant also asserts that the law does not permit a judge to impose consecutive 
terms of probation. Having determined that the imposition of 144 months of probation 
was not in error, we need not reach this issue. 
**20 Affirmed. 
**21 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Presiding Judge and PAMELA T. 
GREENWOOD, Judge. 
Utah App.,2005. 
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ADDENDUM C 
U.S. Const. Amend V 
Amendment V. Grand Jury Indictment for Capital Crimes; Double Jeopardy; Self-
incrimination; Due Process of Law; Just Compensation for Property 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation. 
ADDENDUM D 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-3-201 (2003) 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 3. PUNISHMENTS 
PART 2. SENTENCING 
76-3-201 Definitions —Sentences or combination of sentences allowed — Civil penalties -
-Hearing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any 
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing 
court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a 
person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or 
events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent 
of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a 
victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or 
transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution 
Act. 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted 
of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(f) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant has 
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria 
and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the 
defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant 
was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at 
governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental 
transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear a 
warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection 
(5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant 
transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single trip. 
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, 
to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in the county to 
which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any 
governmental entity for the extradition. 
(6) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the 
defendant to pay court-ordered restitution to the county for the cost 
of incarceration in the county correctional facility before and after sentencing if: 
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the 
county correctional facility; and 
(ii) (A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility 
through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under Section 64-
13c-301 if the defendant is a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility as a 
condition of probation under Subsection 77-18-1(8). 
(b) (i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are: 
(A) the daily core inmate incarceration costs and medical and transportation costs 
established under Section 64-13c-302; and 
(B) the costs of transportation services and medical care that exceed the negotiated 
reimbursement rate established under Subsection 64-13c-302(2). 
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses incurred 
by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable accommodation for an inmate 
qualifying as an individual with a disability as defined and covered by the federal 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including 
medical and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for the court-ordered restitution 
under this Subsection (6), the court shall consider the criteria provided under Subsections 
77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through (iv). 
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under 
Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76- 1-304, the county 
shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of incarceration 
under Subsection (6)(a). 
(7) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of three 
stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the term of 
middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a statement identifying 
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts. If the statement 
is in writing, it shall be filed with the court and served on the opposing party at least four 
days prior to the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest 
or lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case, the probation officer's 
report, other reports, including reports received under Section 76-3-404, statements in 
aggravation or mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further 
evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for imposing 
the upper or lower term. 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing guidelines 
regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by 
the Sentencing Commission. 
(8) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, rape of a child, 
object rape of a child, sodomy upon, a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the defendant 
causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is set forth in the 
information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury 
at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the highest minimum term in state prison. 
This Subsection (8) takes precedence over any conflicting provision of law. 
ADDENDUM E 
U.CA. 1953 § 76-3-401 (2003) 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL C( N>K 
CHAPTER 3. PUNISHMENTS 
PART 4. LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON SENTENCES 
76-3-401 Concurrent or consecutive sentences —Limitations —Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one 
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and 
commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed ai e to i i u: i conci in ei ill) or conseci itively to each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any 
other sentences the defendant is already serving, 
(2) In determining whether state offenses, are to run concurrently or consecutively, the 
court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, 
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later 
offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court 
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are to 
run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request 
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified 
order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or 
concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses ?v ; >f a single 
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences 
imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under Subsection 
(6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs 
after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were committed 
prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing 
court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to 
the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of 
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single 
term that consists of the aggregate of ths validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum 
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, 
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the 
other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer 
remaining imprisonment constitutes the tim,e to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual 
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so 
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose 
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure 
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated 
or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located. 
ADDENDUM F 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-18-1 (2005) 
TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 18. THE JUDGMENT 
§ 77-18-1. Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—Probation— Supervision— 
Presentence investigation—Standards—Confidentiality—Terms and conditions-
Termination, revocation, modification, or extension—Hearings— Electronic 
monitoring 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in 
abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77, 
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally dllwno contest, or conviction of any crime 
or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence 
and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Correctioi is except in • :ases of 
class C misdemeanors or infractions, 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is 
with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court is 
vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards 
for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of services shall 
be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial 
Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and comment 
prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement the 
supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to the 
standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they consider 
appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report and 
submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to supervise 
the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to 
conduct presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions. 
However, the department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in 
accordance with department standards. 
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the 
defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of 
time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the department 
or information from other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement 
according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the effect of the crime on 
the victim and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary 
damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment 
of restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, 
Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic 
evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, are protected and are not 
available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the 
Judicial Council or for use by the department. 
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the 
defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and 
the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in 
the presentence investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the 
department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, 
and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged 
inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies 
cannot be resolved, the court shall make adeterri 1in.at.101 i of i elevanc e and acci irac> on tl le 
record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the 
time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or 
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the 
appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open 
court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require tl lat the 
defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any treatment program in 
which the defendant is currently participating, if the program is acceptable to the court; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail designated by the 
department, after considering any recommendation by the court as to which jail the court 
finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, whi< li iiii i«> unlink Hi* <isr *»I I'lcefioinc 
monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the 
compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, aijd treatment services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in accordance 
with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime yictims Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions, the court .considers appi opi late; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED 
certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense if the defendant has 
not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed 
on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in Subsection 
(8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by 
Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 
during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with Subsection 77-
27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation and any 
extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection (10). 
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon 
completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor 
cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions. 
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection 
(10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined in 
Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the 
defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the 
account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry of civil 
judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately transfer 
responsibility to collect the account to the Office of State Debt Collection. 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon its 
own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why 
his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court. 
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt 
Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when 
termination of supervised probation will occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of 
details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(1 l)(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been 
charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation does not 
constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is 
exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation 
of probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the 
probationer is exonerated at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report w ith 
the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the 
issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the court. 
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by 
the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated 
the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the 
conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute 
violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized probation shall 
determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, 
modification, or extension of probation isJustified, 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the 
defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to show cause 
why his probation should not be revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c)(i) I he order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and si mil be 
served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented by 
counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if 
he is indigent. 
(iv) The order si lall also infoi i n tl le- defendai it of a 'right to pi esent evidence. ' • 
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant,shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall 
present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are based 
shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the court 
for good cause otherwise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present 
evidence. 
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the; conditions of probation, the court may 
order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation term 
commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously 
imposed shall be executed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the Division 
of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a 
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the Utah State 
Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment 
over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic evaluations, are 
classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access 
and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63- 2-403 and 63-2-404, the State 
Records Committee may not order the disclosure of a presentence investigation report. 
Except for disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department 
may disclose the presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the 
department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the subject's 
authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence investigation report 
or the victim's authorized representative, provided that the disclosure to the victim shall 
include only information relating to statements or materials provided by the victim, to the 
circumstances of the crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the 
crime on the victim or the victim's household. 
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation under the 
supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76- 3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home confinement, 
including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to the department in 
accordance with Subsection (16). 
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may order the 
defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring as 
described in this section until further order of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law 
enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electrohi6 monitoring device at all times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the ticMe of the defendant, so that the defendant's 
compliance with the court's order niay be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through electronic 
monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision, of the Depar I: itiiei it of . 
Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the defendant and 
install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to 
the department or the program provider, 
(e) I he department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic 
monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this section either 
directly or by contract with a private provider. 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GERALD STEVEN WALLACE, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 021910910 FS 
Judge: DENO HIMONAS 
Date: September 27, 2004 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marcyt 
Prosecutor: BARLOW, CHARLENE 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SIMMS, CLAYTON A 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 10, 1960 
Video 
Tape Number: 11:20 
CHARGES 
1. SECURITIES FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/12/2004 Guilty 
2. SECURITIES FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/12/2004 Guilty 
3. SECURITIES FRAUD (amended) - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/12/2004 Guilty 
4. SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/12/2004 Guilty 
5. UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/12/2004 Guilty 
6. PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/12/2004 Guilty 
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Case No: 021910910 
Date: Sep 27, 2004 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SALE OF UNREGISTERED 
SECURITY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNREGISTERED SECURITIES 
AGENT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY 
a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the 
Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The counts in this case are consecutively. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 144 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to pay restitution in the amount of $626,000 jointly 
and severally. 
Counsel and defendant will form a stipulated plan of payment within 
60 days. If a stipulation cannot be reached, a hearing will be 
set. 
Restitution is to be paid directly to the Attorney General's 
Office. 
The Court appoints LDA for any appeals defendant may make. 
Defendant is not to act as a fiduciary in the State of Utah. 
Defendant is barred from the involvement/execution of any real 
property transactions as either a principal or as a third party 
with the exception of the sale or acquisition of his primary 
residence. 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - SEPTEMBER 27, 2004 
2 j JUDGE DENO HIMONAS PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 MR. SIMMS: Can we call the Gerald Wallace matter? 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Wallace. 
6 MS. BARLOW: Charlene Barlow on behalf of the State. 
7 MR. SIMMS: Clayton Simms on behalf of Mr. Wallace. 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Wallace is present. I'll note for 
9 the record, I've received a fairly extensive amount of 
10 correspondence from Mr. Wallace's family and friends. I've 
11 taken the opportunity to review each and every one of those 
12 letters as well as the pre-sentence report. 
13 Counsel, have you all received the pre-sentence 
14 report? 
15 MR. SIMMS: I have, Your Honor. 
16 MS. BARLOW: We did. 
17 THE COURT: Had a chance to go through it? 
18 MR. SIMMS: Yes. 
19 I THE COURT: Any corrections that need to be made in 
20 the pre-sentence report? 
21 MR. SIMMS: Just one correction, Judge, on the second 
22 page, rather than all not guilty verdict, they're all guilty 
23 verdict. Actually it's on the — 
24 I THE COURT: I'm not following you, where are you? 
25 MR. SIMMS: Does it state that they're all not guilty 
1 rather than guilty. 
2 THE COURT: Do you want to approach Mr. Simms and 
3 show me what you're - those are the pleas, those aren't the 
4 verdicts, those are the pleas. 
5 MR. SIMMS: There's no corrections then. 
6 THE COURT: Anything else? 
7 MR. SIMMS: No, Your Honor, in terms of corrections. 
8 MS. BARLOW: I would indicate that on Page 5 the pre-
9 sentence writer neglected to include Calvin Paul Stewart as— 
10 THE COURT: Pardon me? 
11 MS. BARLOW: Calvin Paul Stewart as a (inaudible) he 
12 went to trial was found guilty and is currently incarcerated. 
13 THE COURT: Thank you. It seems like we were short. 
14 MS. BARLOW: We were. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Simms, you may proceed? 
16 MR. SIMMS: There are no more corrections but I do 
17 have some comments. I won't go through the facts, the Court 
18 has heard the trial but I would say that Mr. Wallace has a 
19 number of letters of support and that's just an indication of 
20 the type of person that he is. Time and time again they say 
21 that he's an honorable person. He's been doing well despite 
22 this case. He's working graveyard shifts at Hollywood Video, 
23 doing well there and he's doing that because he's going to 
24 school. He's taking, what is it — given his work schedule. 
25 THE COURT: I've read the file carefully, Mr. Simms. 
MR. SIMMS: In addition to that, he's working as an 
actor in Savior of the World. You may notice his beard that 
he's grown. He's in a Christmas play as well. He's working 
again and doing well. 
Again, this has been a tragedy for a number of 
people, including Mr. Wallace. He lost the equity in his home, 
he maxed out credit cards. He and his family lost $480,000. I 
think his portion of that was $60,000. He's doing well now. 
He's had issues of depression because of this case but he's now 
on Wellbutrin and doing well in therapy. 
THE COURT: It sounds like, Mr. Wallace, you had 
issues of depression that remain in this case? 
MR. WALLACE: No sir, I don't. 
THE COURT: Am I wrong that there was an issue 
involving a child? 
MR. SIMMS: I think there was issues of childhood 
abuse but I don't know if there's necessary depression. I 
think Mr. Wallace was a victim of childhood abuse but has done 
well with that and I think he's getting therapy relating to 
this fraud and the damage that it's caused his family. 
THE COURT: I'm referring to the - not the 
allegations, but at about the time that you and your family had 
to deal with these legal matters, your oldest daughter died in 
a car crash? 
MR. WALLACE: That's right. 
1 THE COURT: And that that's the reference that I was 
2 making, causing you some other emotional issues, understandably 
3 causing other emotional issues. 
4 MR. WALLACE: That was after this. 
5 THE COURT: It was afterwards. I'm sorry. 
6 MR. SIMMS: I think if I could get maybe more to the 
7 point, is that the recommendation of 30 days jail is— 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Wallace is not going to jail 
9 (inaudible). 
10 MR. SIMMS: Your Honor, I think that given that, I 
11 think there might be issues in terms of restitution. 
12 THE COURT: Restitution, we're going to have a long 
13 discussion about. 
14 I MR. SIMMS: The difficulty that we have with the 
15 restitution is that he has, in fact, lost everything, he didn't 
16 make an economic gain from this. 
17 THE COURT: Mr. Wallace isn't going to jail, Mr. 
18 Wallace is going to pay restitution if he's responsible for 
19 restitution. That's really not optional. 
20 MR. SIMMS: In terms of - maybe we didn't understand. 
21 Is the Court going to order the restitution in this case or is 
22 this Court looking at something wider or... 
23 THE COURT: It will be part of the order in this 
24 case. Part of the condition for probation will be restitution 
25 and I understand given the amount, we're going to have to talk 
about it and work it out but there is going to be a restitution ' 
requirement. I want to hear from the State first. 
Mr. Barlow, if you want to address the issue of jail ' 
you can but you're going to be whistling in the wind. 
MS. BARLOW: I wasn't intending to anyway, Your 
Honor, and why waste my breath? I do want to indicate to the 
Court a couple of matters that did not come out at trial. One 
l 
is is that Mr. Wallace did in 1986 take (inaudible) and also J 
going back and looking back at the bank records from the Clay j 
Harrison account and also from the Alvin Anderson account, both ' 
people involved in this, that there was, oh, probably over ' 
$50,000 worth of checks that were made out to Mr. Wallace. I 
just wanted to indicate that because as I said— 
THE COURT: I think - Mr. Wallace, you were charged 
and convicted of these crimes. Restitution is appropriate and j 
I want to work out some kind of workable order. I'm not going 
to order jail. It's just not something that anybody has spent 
any time talking to me about but how do we set up, how do we 
set up restitution so that Mr. Wallace isn't set up to fail? 
MR. SIMMS: Your Honor, given his situation working 
at Hollywood Video, having limited means and having seven kids 
at home, I think it would be difficult for him to pay anything 
more than, say, $50 a month. I know that that would be sort of 
a lifetime payment. I think he understands that but I don't 
know how he can— 
1 THE COURT: We're talking about nearly $1 million, I 
2 mean, $626,000 and certainly there's going to be joint and 
3 , several liability. The co-defendants are going to be 
4 i responsible for that as well but $50 a month is not an option. 
i 
5 | MR. SIMMS: And I don't know how much he can do. I 
J 
I 
6 don't think that he can work significantly towards the 
i 
7 i $626,000. I know that he's worked together with Dan Jackson as 
i 
8 I well as other attorneys to get a settlement and to make sure 
9 | that these people are taken care of. I think there's been some 
! 
10 | work with that and I know that Mr. Van Roo's attorney, Mr. Dan 
11 i Jackson is here and I think he would like to speak and maybe he 
12 could comment on where they're at in terms of restitution. 
13 MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, I apologize for my 
14 i appearance but I didn't realize that this was on the calendar. 
15 ' I represent Rich Van Roo and the co-counsel for approximately 
16 I 60 other victims of this fraud. I've been investigating the 
17 ' fraud for about two and a half years as Ms. Barlow will testify 
i 
18 | to and I think I have the best handle on the case as probably 
19 | any one. One of the things that's been important in this case 
i 
20 I is that at an early stage Steve Wallace came forward and 
21 | assisted us in obtaining material information against the co-
i 
22 i defendants and against the companies that employed the co-
I 
23 ' defendants. In addition, he was instrumental in soliciting the 
i 
24 people that he was involved with to come in and talk to us. As 
i 
25 a result in part of his assistance, we were able to fashion a 
1 case against approximately 42 defendants and filed that in 
2 I federal court as a racketeering case. We have accomplished 
3 some initial settlements in that matter that has brought some 
4 restitution to the victims including the people that were 
5 victimized in relationship to Mr. Wallace. 
6 I will note that Clay Harrison has assisted us in a 
7 similar way. None of the other defendants in this matter have 
8 done that and I don't think that we would have the cases that 
9 we had without his assistance. Any questions? 
10 THE COURT: No. 
11 Ms. Barlow? 
12 MS. BARLOW: We all hope that through this federal 
13 lawsuit against especially the parent company of Attorney's 
14 I Title, that money sufficient will come back to pay off all of 
15 these victims. The problem being, of course, all of these 
16 defendants are in the same or similar circumstance as Mr. 
17 Wallace. Some of them are in prison and probably won't be 
18 getting out anytime soon and will not be making any 
19 restitutionary payments. 
20 THE COURT: What is Mr. Harrison's restitution 
21 stipulation? 
22 MS. BARLOW: Well, I'm sorry to laugh but it's 
23 interesting because we had contemplated with Judge Burton that 
24 he would be making some kind of restitutionary, monthly 
25 payment. His attorney said no, that's not what Judge Burton 
1 I said and that's not what the agreement was. He was just 
2 suppose to help in the civil lawsuits. So, I certainly can ask 
3 the court to review that. 
4 THE COURT: That remains to be seen I guess is what 
5 you're saying. 
6 MS. BARLOW: Right. 
7 THE COURT: I appreciate your comments. I appreciate 
8 your comments. The reason we're talking about zero jail time 
9 is Mr. Wallace's cooperation. 
10 I mean if there were no cooperation, given, you know, 
11 these counts Mr. Wallace, you'd conceivably be spending the 
12 rest of your life in the Utah State Prison given the number of 
13 convictions that there are but because of your cooperation, I 
14 think that's why we're only looking at 30-day recommendation to 
15 begin with and why I'm not interested in imposing a jail 
16 sentence but, you know, there's still victims out there and 
17 restitution is appropriate. I want to come up with something 
18 that like I said doesn't put you in a position to fail because 
19 that's not my intent but still recognize that you have an 
20 obligation. 
21 MR. JACKSON: May I be excused? 
22 THE COURT: Yes, of course. 
23 Ms. Barlow, give me a recommendation. 
24 MS. BARLOW: Your Honor, as I recall the restitution 
25 statute - well, you know, we would ask that he be ordered to 
8 
1 j make restitution, complete restitution, that it be joint and 
























lawsuit, like I say, everybody would be thrilled with that. I 
can't speak for how much he can pay per month. Maybe he starts 
out at a lesser amount but as he gets better employment, we 
could certainly review these and maybe have— 
THE COURT: Here's what I'm going to do. I hear you. 
Mr. Wallace, do you want to address the Court before 
I impose sentence? 
MR. WALLACE: Yes, Your Honor, is that's all right. 
THE COURT: It is alright. 
MR. WALLACE: I don't know if it's applicable and you 
can tell me if it matters or not. This was not something that 
I just engaged in light heartedly or flippantly or without any 
due diligence on my part. 
THE COURT: I was with you through the trial, Mr. 
Wallace. 
MR. WALLACE: Not everything got presented in the 
trial as far as my due diligence and if you say it doesn't 
matter, I understand. 
THE COURT: It doesn't. You were convicted. I mean, 
that's... 
MR. WALLACE: Yes, Your Honor, that's fine then. 
THE COURT: I understand that in the face of what 
we've heard before that you maintained that you had a good 
faith basis for doing what you did and I appreciate that. 
MR. WALLACE: And I don't-
THE COURT: That doesn't lift the fact that you have 
restitution obligation. 
MR. WALLACE: And the point that I wanted to bring up 
was it doesn't mitigate my acknowledgment of the loss and 
suffering that others have— 
THE COURT: You have behaved as a gentleman 
throughout the process. I appreciate that. As I've said 
before, but for your cooperation we wouldn't be talking about 
no jail sentence. We'd be talking about you would conceivably 
and realistically been spending the rest of your life in 
prison. That's just not going to happen. But restitution does 
need to be made and what I'm inclined to do is with respect to 
the events of securities fraud, looking at three separate 
charges of securities fraud, counsel, am I right? 
MR. SIMMS: Yes. 
MS. BARLOW: Yes, three of fraud and then the other 
second degree is a pattern of unlawful activity. 
THE COURT: All right. With respect to the four 
second degree felonies, the three counts of securities fraud 
and the pattern of unlawful activity, second degree felonies, I 
proposed the 1 to 15 year terms in the Utah State Prison, no 
fines. I'm going to have them run consecutively and the same 
with the sale of the unregistered security, unregistered 
10 
1 securities agent, the third degree felonies, I'm going to 
2 impose the zero to five year terms and have them run 
3 consecutively as well but I'm going to suspend the entirety of 
4 all of the sentences. I'm not imposing a fine. I'd rather see 
5 any money go towards restitution in this case rather than the 
6 payment of any fine. I don't want you on probation for 36 
7 months. Probation is going to be a lot longer than that. I 
8 want it longer intentionally so that we're giving you as long 
9 an opportunity as possible to make restitution payments. How 
10 far can I set it with six consecutive felonies? 
11 MR. ?: Well, I think you can run it 36 months -
12 THE COURT: Currently on each one? 
13 MS. BARLOW: Mr. Harrison is on probation for 12 
14 years. 
15 THE COURT: That's what I'm inclined to do in this 
16 particular case as well. Place you on probation for a period 
17 of 144 months, a 12-year period. I'm going to order 
18 restitution. You're jointly and severally liable for the 
19 $626,000. You're not to act as a fiduciary in the state of 
20 Utah and you're barred from the involvement and execution of 
21 any real property transactions as either principal or third 
22 party with the exception of the seller acquisition of your 
23 primary residence; however, with respect to restitution, what I 
24 want is to give the state, Ms. Barlow, Mr. Simms, Mr. Wallace 
25 collectively an opportunity to sit down in the next 45 days to 
11 
1 come up with a reasonable restitution plan recognizing, Ms. 
2 Barlow, that it's highly, highly unlikely - I'm not talking 
3 I about one in which he makes complete restitution by himself. 
4 It's just not possible but I want something that's rational, 
5 that doesn't set Mr. Wallace up to fail but at the same time 
6 recognizes the severity of the charges of which he was 
7 convicted. I'm going to ask you to do that and have this 
8 brought before me. I may not be here. I may be in Summit 
9 County at the time but I want it in front of me. I want to 
10 keep possession of this particular case. I'm happy to come 
11 down or we can do it up there within 60 days and if you can't 
12 reach an agreement, I'm ultimately going to fashion one myself. 
13 I'm just hopeful that, you know, counsel you're both very 
14 reasonable so I'm certain you can reach some agreement. 
15 MS. BARLOW: Your Honor, could I suggest that the 
16 payment of restitution be through our office? I know that 
17 Adult Probation and Parole usually assesses a $30 per month and 
18 if we do it through our office we have a federal (inaudible) 
19 and we don't have to— 
20 THE COURT: Certainly, absolutely. 
21 MS. BARLOW: No offense to AP&P. 
22 THE COURT: No, I'm sure AP&P would frankly 
23 ! appreciate that. 
24 MR. ?: Yeah, that would be great. 
25 I MS. BARLOW: Did the Court want to set that 60 days 
12 
1 at this time or what? 
2 THE COURT: No, I think what we'll do - if you can 
3 reach an agreement, a stipulated restitution plan, present it 
4 to me for review and signature. If you can't then I'm going to 
5 ask the State to file a motion within 60 days and schedule a 
6 restitution hearing. 
7 Mr. Simms, Mr. Wallace, questions? 
8 MR. SIMMS: Your Honor, the only other issue - well, 
9 in terms of just having Mr. Wallace advised about his appeal 
10 rights, I think that it might be appropriate to have an LDA 
11 appointed for the purposes of just informing him of his appeal 
12 rights. I don't know if that's appropriate. I know in earlier 
13 stages Mr. Wallace informed me of a desire to appeal. That was 
14 early on and I think maybe that needs to take place so somebody 
15 could advise him about that. 
16 THE COURT: All right. I'm going to appoint, let's 
17 have Mr. Wallace step back. I need the affidavit filled out. 
18 MR. SIMMS 
19 THE COURT 
20 MR. SIMMS 
21 THE COURT 
I have that, Your Honor, filled out. 
You have? 
Yes. 
All right. I'm going to appoint LDA for 
22 I Mr. Wallace and give you a referral to LDA. You will be able 
23 to meet with them and talk to them concerning any potential 
24 appeals. 
25 MR. WALLACE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
13 
1 I THE COURT: All right. Is there anything else in I 
2 this particular matter? 
3 I MS. BARLOW: Not on this matter. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Wallace, anything else? Good luck to 
5 you 
6 | (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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